the regulatory and supervisory systems per se, the changes that have been made since the Mexican crisis in 1994-95, and the challenges they are facing from the new international guidelines. We then move to two cases studies, of Argentina and Brazil, which have two of the most sophisticated systems of regulation and supervision in the region to see why and how they made improvements and what problems remain. We conclude with a discussion of policy lessons that can be drawn from the Latin American experience.
Certainly we are not the first to discuss these topics. On the contrary, over the last few years, there has been a virtual explosion of research on the financial sector in developing countries, including issues of regulation and supervision. 3 We draw on this literature where relevant, both in its theoretical and empirical dimensions, and bring it to bear on the issues under consideration in this book.
The Financial Sector in Latin America in the 1990s
The financial sector in Latin America has undergone major changes in the recent past. Beginning with financial liberalization and passing through crises, rescues, and restructuring, the sector now has quite different characteristics than it did at the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s.
Among the key changes has been a generalized improvement in prudential regulation and supervision. This section provides a brief overview of the region as a whole, both the similarities and the remaining differences among countries. It also looks ahead to how the new system may be affected by changes currently underway at the international level.
Liberalization, Crises, and Rescue: Some Stylized Facts
The essential background for understanding current developments in the financial sector in Latin America is the financial liberalization process, both domestic and international, that took place in the 1980s and 1990s in most countries. Chile was the important exception, where both liberalization and crisis preceded those of its neighbors by at least a decade.
Moving from highly repressed systems, where governments set interest rates, directed credit, and held a large share of bank deposits as required reserves, countries freed commercial banks to make their own decisions on borrowers, loan volume, and prices. At approximately the same time, capital account liberalization enabled local banks to engage in transactions in foreign currencies and allowed foreign institutions to enter local markets. Frequently such changes were made without having in place an adequate regulatory and supervisory system, which compounded problems for bankers without sufficient experience in credit analysis of local borrowers, much less the complexities of international financial markets. 4 The typical results were credit booms, often mismatches between maturities and currencies, followed by banking crises. As seen in the emblematic Chilean case, the errors by the domestic actors themselves could provide the basis for such a crisis; if combined with external shocks, the situation could become far more serious (see Held and Jiménez, 1999) . Government rescues tended to follow a standard package. In the first instance, they involved takeover of nonperforming loans, recapitalization of banks, and liquidations and mergers, usually involving foreign institutions. Later, in an attempt to prevent future crises, regulation and supervision were stepped up, greater information and transparency were required, and deposit insurance was sometimes put in place. In the process, the characteristics of the sector changed. 5
Characteristics of the Financial Sector
Latin American financial sectors remain bank based, but with four important changes in recent years. First, the existing banks have been allowed to enter new activities, resulting in the formation of so-called universal banks. In general, this has been a result of deregulation of banking activities, which expanded bank operations into securities trading, insurance and real estate activities as well as allowing banks to own non-financial firms. This is a trend that has moved in tandem with events in mature economies, 6 but unlike some of the latter, securities markets in developing economies are still very underdeveloped and shallow, and therefore most bank portfolio diversification has been into short-term securities, insurance, and real estate activities. Second, foreign institutions have become increasingly significant actors in the financial sector. This is a overall trend in developing economies, but it has been especially prominent in Latin America (World Bank, 2000: 155-158) . As can be seen in Table 1, foreign assets as a share of total assets have risen substantially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. This development has multiple causes: (i) increase of portfolio flows to the region, up until 1998;
(ii) the privatization of social security and the deregulation of private institutional investors, which led to an increase of investments in securities; and (iii) the virtuous circle created by the process of stabilization and securities market expansion in some economies in the region. It is important to note, however, that even though there has been some diversification of universal banks in the region into securities markets, this has been limited in most Latin American economies, with the exception of Chile.
All four of these trends have implications for the regulatory and supervisory functions.
Larger institutions, a greater mix of activities, and a bigger foreign presence can all complicate the tasks of regulators and supervisors. It means that they must be better trained to understand the new complexities they face, and in some cases they will need greater support from their respective governments to deal with lack of cooperation from their supervisees. At the same time, the new circumstances may also offer advantages, if the banks see it as in their collective interest to improve their image and if foreign supervisory institutions provide useful support.
Insofar as the local financial sector becomes more sophisticated, there will also be the need for coordination between the regulators of the various components. We move now to look at how well equipped the various countries of the region are to deal with these challenges.
Regulation and Supervision: The State of the Art
Drawing on an important new data bank created by the World Bank, 7 we can sketch out the current situation with respect to regulation and supervision of the banking sector in many Latin American countries. Unfortunately, this data base represents a single point in time (circa 1999), so we must reply on qualitative studies of the region itself to identify changes and tendencies. In general, these sources point to substantial improvements, although with important differences remaining across countries. Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) ; for the definition of the indexes, see Appendix 1.
Several indexes are also presented in Table 2 . The "capital stringency index" includes adherence to the BIS guidelines, but also various measures of the degree to which leverage potential is limited (for precise definitions, see Appendix 1). With a range from 1 to 6, where 6 is the most stringent and the U.S. benchmark is at 4, only Argentina among the Latin American countries has a score of 6, followed by Bolivia and Peru; Venezuela lags with a score of 2. The "capital regulation index" combines the previous index with one measuring the type of assets that can count toward the capital-asset ratio, with a range of 1 to 9. On this indicator, Argentina and Bolivia represent the highest degree of stringency, followed by Mexico, with Venezuela again at the rear. The fifth indicator deals with types of activities that banks can engage in and restrictions on who can own a bank. This qualitative index ranges from 1 to 4, with the United
States at 3. Unlike other indicators, Argentina allows the greatest freedom to banks, while
Mexico and Bolivia are the most restrictive.
It is clear from the data presented in Table 2 that regulation has many dimensions, with some countries being stricter on some than on others. Nonetheless, there is some tendency for a cross-country pattern to emerge. As a way of measuring this tendency, we have constructed an additional index (the Overall Regulation Index, ORI) , by dividing the values in each row of Table 2 by the average of that row and then summing them up by country. Figure 1 presents the result of such recalculation.
The figure shows that Argentine regulation is the most strict, followed by Bolivia;
Venezuela is the least restrictive. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the United States has a lower level of restrictions than do many Latin American countries. Likewise, Chile, which is commonly regarded as having the best regulatory and supervisory system in Latin America (Held and Jiménez, 1999) does not rank highly on the overall index. It is possible to hypothesize that some kind of U-shaped relationship is involved, whereby banks become more self-regulating after some level of development (and/or some minimal level of experience) is attained. A rg e n tin a B ra z il B o liv ia C h ile M e x ic o P e ru V e n e z u e la U n ite d S ta te s
Source: See text. Table 3 uses the same data source to examine trends with respect to bank supervision.
While more attention is typically devoted to the topic of regulation, the best regulations are of little use if they are not enforced. Whether this be self-supervision (as implied by the U-shaped relationship just mentioned) or supervision carried out by a government body, the point is that provision for the implementation of regulations must be separately analyzed. The United States is in the middle.
The last two items in Table 2 deal with what the World Bank calls private monitoring.
The index on this topic measures whether an external audit is required, the percent of the ten largest banks that are rated by international rating agencies, the degree of accounting disclosure and director liability, and the lack of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. On a scale of 1 to 8, the United States, Argentina, Chile and Peru score 8, while Mexico and Venezuela are lowest at 6. The percentage of top banks rated by international agencies shows the United States, Argentina, and Brazil at 100%, while the other countries in our sample are between 20% and 50%.
In order to present a clear view of the degree of supervision in each economy, we have created a Overall Supervision Index (OSI), following the same methodology used to construct the ORI with only one additional procedure. In order to make all variables more compatible, we have reversed the values of the variable "Likelihood Supervisors Moves in Banking", as we understand that the higher the probability of that occurring, the more easily supervisors can be captured by supervised banks and thus the less rigid the supervision will be. Figure 2 presents the values for OSI across the countries in our sample. As shown in Figure 2 , Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have the highest ratings (the strictest supervisory standards), with Venezuela at the low end, along with Bolivia (which, paradoxically, has a comparatively high ORI). Again, as with the overall index on regulation, the United States and Chile rank lower than the highest-ranking countries in Latin America.
The data presented in Tables 2 and 3 have at least two important problems. First, they represent only a single point in time and, second, they are overview measures that must summarize a large amount of information in a single number. To get a better idea of some of the details as well as the changes in the regulatory and supervisory systems in recent years, we have to turn to studies of the region per se.
In one of the most important studies, Aguirre (2000) stresses that important changes have been made in banking legislation in almost all of the 17 countries he surveyed. In general, he says, these changes have come about as a result of crises or serious problems in the respective banking systems. Aguirre identifies key changes as less public-sector ownership, greater foreign participation, broader scope for banking activities, and improvements in supervisory and regulatory authority. With respect to the latter, he focuses mainly on institutional aspects, such as the agency that performs supervision and the scope of the mandate of such institutions (only banks, or also insurance and securities). He finds a wide difference across countries, but admits that the literature is not conclusive on the relative merits of different systems.
Another study, by Livacic and Sáez (2000) , focuses specifically on supervision. Again noting the improvements during the 1990s, they emphasize the gap between the rules on the books and the ability of supervisors to enforce them. Examples include loans to "related" clients and the treatment of overdue loans on banks' books. They suggest various remedies, including the need for more resources (financial and human) and greater autonomy for supervisors.
Basle II and the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programs
The previous section provides substantial evidence that bank regulation and supervision in Latin
America have improved in recent years. A good deal of the change has been a response to trends in individual countries or, to some extent, in the region more broadly (especially the Mexican crisis of 1994-95). Nonetheless, developments at the international level have also played a role.
In particular, the BIS and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision have been influential in putting these issues onto the agenda and homogenizing standards for developed and developing countries alike. In the current period, however, international standards themselves are in a state of flux, and the proposed changes pose new challenges to developing country institutions. In particular, the Basle Committee has presented a new scheme to replace the previous one based on the 8% minimum capital-asset ratio, while the IMF has taken the lead in proposing a long list of codes and standards with respect to the financial sector. These changes are analyzed in detail by Stephany Griffith-Jones in Chapter X of this volume; here we merely want to note some of the consequences that these proposed changes may have for the topics we have been analyzing.
[to be completed later]
Regulation and Supervision after 1994-95: Argentina and Brazil
The previous examination of regional trends in the financial sector generally, and regulation and supervision more specifically, have provided an idea of the direction of changes and some notion of the causes. We believe it is useful, however, to look more in detail at the experiences of some countries to understand better the reform process as well as the problems that still remain. In addition, such studies will cast light on the crucial interaction of the financial sector with the macroeconomy of the respective countries and the limitations that the latter imposes on any attempts to improve the operation of the financial system. Argentina and Brazil have been selected for our case studies since, as seen in the preceding discussion, they tend to have the strictest regulations and supervision; thus they are especially useful for addressing the questions of process and remaining problems.
2.1.1. Argentina's banking sector before 1995
From the beginning of President Menem's first administration in 1989, Argentina underwent a deep process of financial liberalization 9 that lifted most of the controls on domestic and foreign operations of the domestic financial system that had been imposed during the period of high inflation and external constraints. 10 The result was a concentrated system, dominated by 9 This was the second Argentine attempt at liberalizing reforms. In 1977, the Argentine government also carried out a liberalizing financial reform, but it had to be reversed due to a banking crisis that led to the nationalization of a significant part of the banking sector. For an analysis of this earlier attempt, see Studart and Hermann (2001: 34-38) . 10 See Studart and Hermann (2001: 38-39 ) for a list of the main regulatory changes in 1989.
universal banks, open to foreign participation, and free from most legal constraints on banking activities.
In addition to these regulatory changes, the macroeconomic context was of one of the main determinants of the performance of the banking system until the Tequila crisis. Two important factors were: (i) price stability and a fixed exchange rate regime abruptly reduced both inflation and exchange rate risks; (ii) the international scenario of the early 1990s, marked by rising liquidity, declining international interest rates, and the exceptional performance of the U.S.
economy, led to a surge of optimism in the Argentine financial markets. These domestic and external factors created a fertile environment for the rapid growth of financial activity.
Indeed, the Argentinean financial sector had an impressive recovery until 1995: the levels of deposits and loans increased rapidly, while peso and dollar lending rates fell significantly.
These results were a mix of several important features: (i) A process of rapid monetizationwhich normally follows price stability-led to a rapid growth of deposits in the banking sector;
(ii) An increase of foreign capital inflows, which increased the confidence in the Convertibility Plan, raised banks' propensity to make dollar-denominated loans and borrowers' willingness to borrow in dollars, and produced a slightly lower interest rate in dollars, thus leading to a rapid process of dollarization of both liabilities and assets of the banking sector; (iii) The increase of competition among banks and the improvement of overall confidence reduced banks' liquidity preference, resulting in a rapid expansion of credit despite the initial poor macroeconomic performance. In the case of domestic banks, this increased liquidity pushed them into being less careful in their lending strategies and thus deteriorated portfolio quality.
By 1994, then, the main vulnerabilities of the banking system were related to the higher leverage of the banking sector due to the rapid expansion of loans, increased liability and asset dollarization, and thus widened maturity and exchange-rate mismatching. It is exactly these characteristics that explain the strong impacts that the Tequila crisis had on the system.
The effects of the 1994-95 Mexican crisis
As seen above, the stability of the banking system in Argentina in 1994 was very much dependent on the maintenance of low exchange risks (and thus on the continued flow of foreign capital required to finance its increasing external financing needs) and the stability of domestic interest rates (due to the increased levels of indebtedness both in dollars and pesos). Thus two features that characterized the 1994-95 Mexican crisis were bound to have destabilizing effects on Argentina's banks: the hike of U.S. interest rates in 1994 that contributed to the financial difficulties in Mexico, and the subsequent reversal of the capital flows to developing economies.
The currency board system in Argentina meant that domestic monetary authorities had no other instrument to face the potential capital outflows but to allow domestic rates to rise in 1995.
This rise in interest rates provoked an increase of arrears and defaults in the banking sector, and reduced the confidence of depositors, leading to significant withdrawals of deposits from 1994.
By May 1995, the loss of deposits had reached US$8.4 billion, around 19% of the total deposits of the banking system (Lopetegui, 1996: 14) .
The combination of deteriorating quality of assets and loss of deposits pointed to the vulnerable side of the until then seemingly solid Argentinean system. In order to avoid an open banking crisis, the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) began injecting liquidity through its discount window, backed by the sale of dollar-denominated bonds -which in turn led to an increasing exchange-rate exposure of the government-and by reducing the required reserves of banks.
Despite this attempt by BCRA, the accumulated loss corresponded to 12.2% of the banking sector's net worth by the first semester of 1995.
As is well documented, the crisis was only reversed by decisive support from the IMF and World Bank. But the solution to the crisis also involved a significant fiscal adjustment, which led to a GDP contraction of 4.6% in 1995. For our purposes here, the crisis exposed the fragility of the domestic banking sector, which in turn prompted a set of regulatory and supervisory reforms and an acceleration of the internationalization of the Argentine banking sector from 1995 onwards.
Regulatory changes after the 1994-95 crisis
After the 1995, it became a consensual view that one of the main weaknesses of Argentinean economy under its new monetary system was the potential vulnerability of the banking sector to changes in domestic interest rates, exchange rates, and depositor confidence. It also became apparent that domestic banks were more vulnerable than the foreign-owned ones. Finally, it also became clear that, since the capacity of the monetary authorities to intervene in periods of crisis was very limited under the Convertibility Plan, some additional mechanisms were need to increase systemic liquidity.
In order to overcome these weaknesses, an initial set of measures was introduced to restructure the sector by injecting more capital, promoting mergers and acquisitions, and creating incentives to the expansion of foreign banks. Among the most important regulatory changes in
Argentina after 1995, five should be emphasized. (ii) The Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos (FGD): The FGD, introduced in May 1995, was a deposit insurance scheme funded by private funds, aimed at avoiding "bank runs".
It was a measure to increase depositor confidence and the safety nets of the banking sector.
(iii) A new system of reserve requirements: In order to reduce leverage and to improve safety, the new system widened the scope of the previously existing policy to encompass all bank liabilities, rather than just sight and saving deposits as was the case earlier. The results of these policies were quite positive in many respects. In the second half of the 1990s, private bank provisions in relation to total credit increased substantially; liquidity within the banking sector increased, and the capital adequacy ratio was maintained at levels far beyond those establish by the Basle I guidelines. In addition foreign banks more than doubled their share of the market between 1994 and 1999. In sum, the banking sector became more solid, which partly explains why its ability to deal with the emerging market crises that characterized the late 1990s -the Asian crisis (October 1997), the Russian crisis (August 1998), and the Brazilian crisis (January 1999)-was far superior to what was observed after the Mexican crisis. The effects of this first round external financial liberalization were only to be felt with the change of credit conditions abroad (Studart, 1994) . From 1992 onwards, capital flows into Brazil began rising rapidly, mainly due to the reversion of domestic capital flight from the 1980s. The increase of reserves relaxed the balance-of-payment constraint, which was binding in the 1980s, and created room for an exchange-rate-based stabilization program: the Real Plan.
The second stage of liberalization had to do with opening the Brazilian market to the expansion of existing foreign, financial institutions and the entry of new ones (especially banks and investment banks) which happened after 1994. This is perhaps the most important result of the new regulatory framework that emerged after the Mexican crisis.
The 1994-95 crisis
Unlike Argentina, the causes of the 1995 banking crisis preceded the Mexican crisis, even though the latter deepened the problems within Brazil's banking sector. The fundamental reasons are associated with the abrupt adjustment that the banks had to undertake due to the success of the Real Plan. During the 1980s, banks earned substantial profits from inflationary gains associated with the peculiar role of double intermediary of the public debt that the Brazilian banks enjoyed during the long period of high inflation and indexation.
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The abrupt decline of these gains, and the high fixed costs in Brazil's banking sector, led private banks to initially expand credit -basically through consumer and commercial loans-12 On this, see Studart and Hermann (2001) .
which allowed the boom in the demand for consumer-goods following the Real Plan. 13 The rapid and sometimes careless expansion of credit, the high interest rate policy, and the rising unemployment provoked a rise of non-performing credit and arrears.
The monetary authorities tried to restrict this expansion by setting very high levels of reserve requirements, which nonetheless failed to constrain the expansion of credit. In addition, interest rates were maintained at high levels, which created an increasingly dangerous mix of credit expansion and high lending rates. The public banks faced additional problems due to their limited capacity to restructure their portfolios (dominated by state government debt) and their high operational costs (in view of the job stability of many of their employees).
The Mexican crisis was only "the last straw" in a process of increasing bank problems, as the response of the monetary authorities to the reversal of capital flows was as an abrupt increase of interest rates. Consequently, the Brazilian banking system went through severe difficulties in the aftermath of the Real Plan, which prompted a series of Central Bank interventions meant to avoid systemic risk and to restructure the banking system. entry has not changed fundamentally the way the domestic banking sector acts: credit rationing is still a reality, spreads are significantly higher than those found in developed and even most in developing economies, and foreign players tend to concentrate their portfolio in public debt.
Complimentary regulatory measures
In addition to the thorough restructuring of the banking sector, a series of complementary regulatory measures were also decreed in late 1995. These included the establishment of a deposit insurance fund (the Fundo de Garantia de Créditos-FGC) guaranteeing up to R$20,000 14 The public banks in Brazil suffered significant losses with the decline of inflation. First, they were by far the greatest suppliers of loans in the system (over 75% in the 1990s) when inflation gains ceased. Second, the increase of interest rates and the expansion of primary deficits increased state and municipal debts substantially after 1992, and public banks are the main financiers of such debts in Brazil.
per depositor, and barriers for establishing new banks (e.g., increased capital requirements).
Separately, new Central Bank regulations aimed to promote accountability and avoid bailouts by insuring that the shareholders of institutions sold or transferred were liable for any previous wrongdoing.
Perhaps the most significant of the new measures was the law giving the Central Bank authorization to preventatively restructure financial institutions that were not meeting system requirements or were demonstrating financial problems. While a form of this law had existed previously, and the Central Bank was authorized to place banks under one of three forms of special regime (temporary system of special administration, intervention, or extra-judicial liquidation), these laws lacked a preventative character. Now the Central Bank was empowered to prescribe preventative remedies (e.g., increased capitalization, transfer of stockholder control, or mergers and acquisitions) for faltering banks, and certain assets of failing banks could now be confiscated.
As a result, 205 financial institutions have been taken over or intervened in one form or another by the Central Bank since the start of the Real Plan; some 25% of those institutions were banks. Overall, 92% of these financial institutions were closed, and 65% of the intervened banks were closed since mid 1994. The number of banks in operation also fell since the Real Plan began, after having risen sharply since the 1988 Constitution established universal banking in
Brazil. The number of banks in operation more than doubled (120 percent) between year-end 1988 and 1993. However, in the three-year period between year-end 1994 and 1997, the number fell 12% from 246 to 219 (Studart and Hermann, 2001 ). The crisis hit these economies after a period of significant rise in loan volume, and thus of high indebtedness of both private sector and government. In the case of Argentina, the main effect of the crisis was a simultaneous deterioration of bank portfolios -as the interest rate hike plus a significant economic contraction affected domestic borrowers' capacity to service their debts -whereas on the liability side the loss of confidence led to a rapid fall in deposits. In Brazil, the crisis hit the economy when loans were increasing rapidly and in a rather careless manner after the successful (and abrupt) achievement of price stability with the Real Plan. The interest rate hike led to severe deterioration of Brazilian banks' assets and significant losses by the weaker banks.
In both countries, important changes in supervision and regulation were to follow.
Argentina rapidly enhanced prudential regulation, expanded the safety net for the banking sector, and allowed further concentration and the expansion of foreign banks. This was an explicit policy, due to the belief that an expanding foreign participation in the sector would make it more competitive and less vulnerable to exchange and interest rate shocks.
In Brazil, a deep process of policy-induced restructuring of the system took place, basically through privatization, mergers, and acquisitions of banks -often promoted by the government-leading to a rapid change of the ownership structure of the banking sector. In addition, but at a slower pace than in Argentina, prudential regulation and measures to increase transparency and safety of the banking sector were also introduced in Brazil.
These changes made only superficial alterations to the functioning of the banking sector (except for the growing role of foreign actors), but they increased the solidity of the banking sectors in both countries, making them less vulnerable to the crises that characterized the second half of the 1990s.
Nonetheless, both systems still have important shortcomings. First, both are highly vulnerable to changes in the macroeconomic environment -especially to changes in borrowing rates and economic cycles. As mentioned before, this is a structural problem related to bankbased financial systems, where banks tend to be highly leveraged even in periods of low growth.
Such a feature becomes even more a source of potential vulnerability in a context of high macroeconomic instability and interest rate volatility. Second, the stability the Argentinean banking system is highly dependent on the maintenance of the current exchange rate system, as devaluation would certainly result in a simultaneous deterioration of its assets and liabilities and possible deposit drains. Third, both banking systems have increased tremendously their liquidity preference, which means that, even in the context of a macroeconomic environment better than the current one, credit rationing will continue to be one of the most important financial constraint to economic recovery in these economies in the future.
Conclusions: Policy Lessons from the Latin American Experience
The general Latin American experience with banking regulation and supervision, and especially the more detailed examination of the Argentina and Brazilian cases, provides the basis for suggesting several policy lessons for developing countries.
First, it is clear that much remains to be done in the specific areas of regulation and supervision. Some countries are more advanced than others, but all can do more in terms of institutional development in the supervisory area, greater transparency of regulations, and so on.
Nonetheless, it is important to ponder the apparent relationship that emerged whereby the tightest regulations are not necessarily found in the best-performing banking systems. This may mean that strict regulations are important as the banking system begins to develop, but it may be possible to relax them somewhat in the longer run.
Second, even those countries that have made substantial progress in the regulatory and supervisory sphere cannot assume that this is sufficient. Even the best regulatory and supervisory systems assume a relatively stable macroeconomic environment. In a situation of strong volatility, whether domestic or international, or both, the financial system will become increasingly fragile. Thus, regulation of the financial sector must go hand in hand with adequate fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies as well as with measures to prevent external shocks from ravaging local economies.
Third, there are other problems in the financial sector that have little to do with regulation and supervision -or may even involve tradeoffs with the latter. That is, the main function of the financial sector is to support the development of the local economy. This involves the providing of credit in such volume that production and consumption can grow at an appropriate rate. If regulations are too tight, then this may make banks prefer to hold only the safest assets, whether government bonds or loans to the largest and lowest-risk customers in the private sector.
Consideration must be given to these aspects of the financial system and balance them with the obvious need to made the system a safer one.
Finally, a sound domestic regulatory and supervisory system in developing countries must be complemented by a supportive international environment. This includes adequate macroeconomic coordination in industrial countries as well as appropriate regulation of the financial systems in those economies. It also means that any new international regulations must consider the implications for developing countries. It must be recognized that the impact on the financial sector of industrial and developing countries is not the same, and both must be taken into account.
